

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

VOLUME 1

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

NUMBER 9

*Congress
and
Foreign
Policy*

*Interviews
with
Senator
Richard Lugar
and Representative
Lee Hamilton*





U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

Congress and Foreign Policy

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

USIA ELECTRONIC JOURNALS

VOLUME 1 • NUMBER 9 • JULY 1996

More than 200 years ago the framers of the U.S. Constitution established a system of checks and balances — divisions of responsibility — among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the federal government, to ensure that no single branch would wield too much power. The legislative branch — Congress — makes the law; the executive branch implements it; and the judicial branch interprets it. This process diffuses power widely throughout the federal system.

It often happens that the U.S. President represents one party while the opposition party controls one or both houses of Congress. And even if the majority in Congress belongs to the same political party as the President, Congress still is an independent entity; therefore the President and his cabinet officials must work to persuade legislators to support administration positions.

Because of the Constitution's system of checks and balances, policy is often a reconciliation of differences, a distillation of compromise. This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda seeks to explain this political dynamic as it unfolds in the foreign policy arena.

Featured in the Focus Section are interviews with a Republican Senator and a Democratic Representative in Congress — both widely known for their foreign policy expertise, an interview with a former top Clinton administration official responsible for managing White House relations with Congress, and an article by a prominent political scientist explaining the constitutional and historical relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government on foreign policy. Additional articles assess the role of the current Congress in carrying out its foreign policy mandate, describe the impact of lobbyists on foreign policy-making and survey U.S. legislators on the foreign policy concerns of their constituents.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

● FOCUS

U.S. CONSTITUTION INVITES “TUG AND PULL” ON FOREIGN POLICY 5

*By Professor Frederick L. Holborn
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University*

INVOLVING CONGRESS EARLY: PRESIDENTIAL IMPERATIVE 9

*An interview with Senator Richard Lugar
Senior Republican Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee*

IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER SHIFT ON FOREIGN POLICY 13

*An interview with Representative Lee Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member, House International Relations Committee*

PROMOTING THE PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA IN CONGRESS 17

*An interview with Patrick Griffin
Former Assistant to President Clinton for Legislative Affairs*

● COMMENTARY

CONGRESS: PARTISAN BUT NOT ISOLATIONIST 20

*By Peter W. Rodman
Director of National Security Programs, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom*

NEW CONGRESSIONAL ASSERTIVENESS IN FOREIGN POLICY 23

*By Jeremy D. Rosner
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

● THE PROCESS AND THE PLAYERS

HOW LOBBYISTS INFLUENCE FOREIGN POLICY 26

Interviews with Thomas Hale Boggs and Donald Massey

LAWMAKERS ASSESS CONSTITUENTS’ FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS 29

Survey shows impact of these issues across America

FROM BILL TO LAW: A LONG AND COMPLEX PROCESS 34

Tracing the steps from introduction to enactment

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS 35

Various panels in both chambers actively engaged

DEPARTMENTS

ACTION ON CAPITOL HILL

38

Defense authorization, anti-ballistic missile defense, Iran sanctions, immigration

SPOTLIGHT ON U.S. SPEAKERS

39

Former defense official Lawrence L. Korb on Congress and defense policy

A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BIBLIOGRAPHY

40

Spotlighting other views on the subject

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: KEY INTERNET SITES

41

Internet links to resources on Congress

ARTICLE ALERT: OTHER POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

42

Abstracts of current articles

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

USIA's electronic journals, published and transmitted worldwide at two-week intervals, examine major issues facing the United States and the international community. The journals — Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, and U.S. Society and Values — provide analysis, commentary, and background information in their thematic areas. French and Spanish language versions appear one week after the English. The opinions expressed in the journals do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government. Articles may be reproduced and translated outside the United States unless copyright restrictions are cited on the articles.

Current or back issues of the journals can be found on the U.S. Information Service (USIS) Home Page on the World Wide Web at "<http://www.usia.gov/journals/journals.htm>". They are available in several electronic formats to facilitate viewing on-line, transferring, downloading and printing. Comments are welcome at your local USIS post or at the editorial offices:

*Editor, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda
Political Security - I/TPS
U.S. Information Agency
301 4th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547*

ejforpol@usia.gov

PUBLISHER Judith S. Siegel
EDITOR Margaret A. McKay
MANAGING EDITOR Wendy S. Ross
ASSOCIATE EDITORS Wayne Hall
. Guy Olson
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS Hugo Bayona
. Ralph Dannheisser
. Jim Kelman
. Rick Marshall
. Dian McDonald
. Jacqui S. Porth
REFERENCE AND
RESEARCH SPECIALISTS Samuel M. Anderson
. Vivian Stahl
ART DIRECTOR Barbara Morgan
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Yvonne Shanks
GRAPHICS ASSISTANT Sylvia Scott
EDITORIAL BOARD Howard Cincotta
. Judith S. Siegel
. Pamela H. Smith

U.S. CONSTITUTION INVITES “TUG AND PULL” ON FOREIGN POLICY

*By Frederick L. Holborn
Senior Adjunct Professor of American Foreign Policy
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University*

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there is a temptation to assume that the current contentiousness in foreign affairs between the White House and Congress is a departure from earlier bipartisan consensus, but this is at best “a partial truth,” says the author. He points to the prevailing view of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution that foreign policy is too important to be left to the President alone and that tension between the branches of government is to be expected.

Holborn, who has taught at SAIS since 1971, also works as a consultant to the American Political Science Association and directs an intensive seminar course on Congress and foreign policy for diplomats serving in Washington. He was a legislative assistant to Senator John F. Kennedy from 1959-1961 and a special assistant in the White House from 1961-1966.

An understanding of the U.S. Constitution is essential in order to fathom the role that Congress plays in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

Today, when we hear frequent appeals for a restoration of “bipartisanship” between the executive and legislative branches of government on foreign policy matters, we need to recall that the Constitution stipulated no natural harmony in foreign affairs, but rather anticipated a considerable degree of tension and inefficiencies between the President and the Congress.

The U.S. Constitution, unlike documents establishing almost all other governments, did not even endorse the supremacy of the executive in foreign affairs but rather laid out a mosaic of powers distinct to each branch, as well as shared responsibilities. Although there was not unanimity among the framers of the Constitution, the prevailing view was that foreign policy was too important to be left only to Presidents. The framers did not map out all the precise boundary lines among the branches, but they clearly sought a large and consequential role for Congress.

In one area especially important in contemporary world politics — trade — authority to approve agreements is granted exclusively to the Congress.

The President cannot even complete a trade negotiation without a prior and explicit delegation of authority by the Congress. The President’s powers in this area are therefore wholly contingent on congressional approval and, when that approval is granted, it is usually limited in time and scope.

The raising of military forces and the declaration of war are defined clearly in the Constitution as legislative powers. Yet the President is clearly designated as Commander-in-Chief and is given the power to recognize foreign governments and to negotiate treaties. But even this last power is constrained by the necessity of obtaining an extraordinary two-thirds vote of approval in the Senate for a treaty to take effect. In addition, nominations of U.S. diplomats as well as cabinet and other top policy officials, must be confirmed by the Senate.

And perhaps most important in an era when the implementation of almost all foreign policy requires the commitment of money, there is an inescapable constitutional necessity for the executive to go to Congress to obtain the necessary funds for any foreign affairs operation.

The third branch of government, the judiciary, is set up to rule on matters that cannot be settled by

the other two branches. In reality the Supreme Court has only rarely decided cases with foreign policy importance. But in those few instances where it has — such as relocation of Japanese Americans to internment camps during World War II, revocation of the Security Treaty with Taiwan in 1979 after the normalization of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China, and decisions on financial claims issues arising out of the 1979-1981 Iranian hostage crisis — it has generally reinforced the executive position. Most of the time, however, the court refuses to take such cases, preferring to leave their resolution to the tug and pull between the legislative and executive branches. It refused, for example, to rule on the non-declaration of war in Korea or various issues raised about the legalities of the Vietnam War.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there is a temptation to assume that the current executive-legislative contentiousness in foreign affairs is a departure from earlier bipartisan consensus. This is at best a partial truth. If bipartisanship is defined as a condition in which major policies obtain the support or at least wary tolerance of substantial segments of both major political parties, then that has been the case only in the period 1943-50, during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, and again in 1953-58, during a good part of the Eisenhower administration, when there was close collaboration between the President and the congressional leadership of both parties. The Korean War in 1950-52 caused deep fissures in congressional bipartisanship and sapped the political fortunes of the Truman administration almost as much as the Vietnam War later paralyzed the Johnson administration. To be sure bipartisanship has persisted episodically since then, with considerable continuity in areas such as the Middle East. But on some issues — such as China — there has never been a bipartisan consensus. And in recent years there have been a number of other issues where political support has been fragile or volatile — trade, aid to post-Soviet Russia and the newly independent states, enlargement of NATO, and the U.S. role in the Balkans following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

It is also important to realize that Congress's influence cannot be assessed solely on the basis of its recorded votes. Quite often the power of Congress is a deterrent one. A President always must take into consideration what Congress might or might not do. Often he decides not to take action or to delay it because the political price of pressing it through the Congress and mobilizing public support seems too high or might cripple other Administration objectives — foreign or domestic. For example, the cautious pace the executive branch took in the normalization of relations with Vietnam reflected the deep congressional divisions on the issue.

Sometimes Presidents will take risks by trying to preempt Congress with a *fait accompli*: President Roosevelt's deal with Britain in 1940 to exchange 50 U.S. destroyers for base rights on British possessions in the Western hemisphere, the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China in 1971-72, the wheat deal with the Soviet Union at the same time, President Bush's commitment of troops to the Gulf in 1990-91, and President Clinton's recent actions in Haiti and Bosnia. In each case the President did not await prior congressional consent and each situation prompted heated debate in Congress. But outright repudiations of the President's policy were rare — especially in cases where American troops were already engaged as in Haiti and Bosnia. Congressional debates and anxieties, however, probably caused the Clinton administration to define U.S. interests more closely and limit the duration of the American military presence in those countries.

In the case of Iraq, President Bush was reluctantly persuaded to let Congress debate in January 1991 a resolution for proceeding with direct military action against the Saddam Hussein regime. The issue was contentious and closely fought in the Senate. However President Bush, despite the narrow vote of support in the Senate, gained added legitimacy for Desert Storm.

With skill and adroitness Presidents may succeed in acting unilaterally, but at other times they pay a subsequent price for not involving the Congress at

an earlier stage. For example, when President Carter submitted the Taiwan Relations Act to Congress for its approval early in 1979, his failure to adequately involve Congress at an earlier stage led Congress to produce a much expanded version of the act which nearly nullified normalization of ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

What must be stressed, in speaking of Congress, is that Congress is not monolithic in its views and only sometimes acts as a unitary body. Much of the time when we speak or read about "Congress," attention is in fact on actions by one house of Congress, or one committee, or a few strongly insistent members, or even one member.

It is rare for Congress to have a comprehensive, integrated policy position when debate opens on an issue. Occasionally a policy such as the Marshall Plan or the treaty establishing NATO will have such support. Most of the time, however, legislation as it moves through Congress is changed through amendments, specific policy directives and prohibitions. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) debate — originally directed largely at the Soviet Union and Romania and now at the center of U.S.-China relations — has its source in an amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 sponsored by Senator Henry Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik. In the first five years of the Reagan administration, the strenuous debate on U.S. policy regarding Nicaragua and aid to the Contras centered on an amendment to control covert assistance sponsored by Representative Edward Boland. Quite often — on human rights issues, for example — policy is an accretion of many individual actions and amendments Congress has enacted over a period of years.

Congress seldom prevails on a foreign policy issue about which the President has strongly held positions. Standoffs and deadlocks may occur, but the threat of a presidential veto is a powerful weapon for encouraging Congress to work with the President to make accommodations. For Congress to override a presidential veto requires a two-thirds vote separately in each chamber. On an issue such as MFN for China, both the President's

use and threat of a veto has preserved the Executive Branch position in the Bush and Clinton administrations. On the vote in 1986 to impose economic sanctions on South Africa, the Congress did succeed in overriding a presidential veto. But most often Congress presses its position to a point just short of inviting a veto.

In the aftermath of World War II, changes occurred in the intensity and scope of the executive-legislative relationship. The House of Representatives rose in influence as more and more foreign policy legislation — especially the Marshall Plan and foreign aid — could only be realized through spending bills, which under the Constitution must originate in the House of Representatives. During the formative stages of the United Nations in 1943-45, President Roosevelt instituted a more regularized process of consultation with the leaders of both parties in both houses of Congress. Under the next four Presidents — Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson — this bipartisan consultative process persisted on almost all major foreign policy matters.

But the character of the relationship changed again during the later years of the Vietnam War, when power in Congress moved from an older generation to younger members who fought against the tight control of Congress by its leadership and committee chairs. This led to a decline in the ability of leaders to represent the interests of the members of their chamber or even their party in consultation and negotiation with the Executive Branch. Younger members began to have more influence, more committees and subcommittees were created, and more procedural ways were developed to open up the legislative process to all members.

Perhaps as important was the growing sense in Congress that the executive branch — after its long support for the Vietnam war and the resignation of President Nixon following the Watergate scandal — no longer possessed a monopoly or even a large margin of advantage in information, intelligence and policy insight. With the expansion of congressional staffs, the enlarged

universe of think tanks as varied in their viewpoints as the Heritage Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, advocacy groups and lobbyists, members of Congress felt they could have access to information as credible as that of the Executive Branch.

Generally the atmosphere in Congress became more partisan and discordant. Sometimes, there was a real party split in viewpoints, as on Central American policy in the 1980's when Republicans and Democrats had clearly contrasting positions on El Salvador and aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. Other contentious issues in recent years have caused controversy within both parties — such as aid to Russia, Bosnia, NATO enlargement and trade. Although differences between and within parties often are not as deep as they seem, the mobilization of common positions between Congress and the President nevertheless has become more laborious.

For the past several years, in growing measure, foreign policy has been driven by congressional attempts to reduce spending in order to balance the budget. Not only have the budgets for defense, foreign aid and international relations shrunk, but the President is given little latitude or discretion in spending. Each new undertaking — whether in peacekeeping, disaster relief or aid to emerging fragile democracies — has an explicit price tag and can only be undertaken by sacrificing some existing program. Budget caps and ceilings have become firm and “firewalls” have been created through legislation to prevent the flow of money from one federal policy sector to another. Short of a stark and serious emergency, support and money must be mustered in Congress for each separate event or initiative.

Occasionally, a President may discover a way to act on his own, as with the U.S. loan to Mexico in 1995, when President Clinton discovered long existing but never used legislation that enabled

him to act without the approval of Congress. This kind of circumvention, however, usually becomes a one time recourse since Congress can close off future use of that option. Though the budgetary regimen now in place applies to all areas of discretionary spending, its effects have fallen with special force on foreign policy, which lacks a strong domestic constituency of its own. At times this may usefully encourage the President to justify his policies with more clarity, but it also can prevent the President from carrying out desirable actions or significantly delay and dilute them. For example, already exposed programs such as U.S. dues to the United Nations and subscriptions to international lending institutions become even more vulnerable.

In the end, the role of Congress in foreign policy is closely linked to the larger international and political environment. It is possible to detect new tendencies of thought among members of Congress, who define American interests in the post-Cold War world more austere and narrowly than in the past. Beyond this, however, Congress also reflects and reacts to world events, the leadership and sense of direction provided by the President, the ability of experts and media to frame issues with clarity, and to public opinion. If presidential leadership is muffled, public opinion apathetic, and experts highly discordant, then the likelihood is that Congress will echo those conditions. History tells us that most of the time Congress performs neither better nor distinctly worse than the wider social order of which it is a part. It can be a vehicle of delay, inefficiency, deadlock, even mischief. Reassuringly it also generally responds to genuine urgencies and frequently provides the therapy of open debate and oversight and greater transparency of policy, and heightens public appreciation of both the risks and potentialities of new policies. The skepticism of Congress may degenerate into corrosive cynicism; it also can cast new light on and give fresh energy to the unending debate about America's role in the world. ●

INVOLVING CONGRESS EARLY: PRESIDENTIAL IMPERATIVE

An interview with Republican Senator Richard Lugar

A President can encounter real problems in achieving his foreign policy goals if he fails to bring a broad cross-section of Congress into the process right at the start, says Lugar.

Indeed, the legislature's power of the purse — its control over the funding of federal government programs — is an ever-present threat to the implementation of policies devised without such consultations, he notes.

Lugar, an Indiana Republican, is a former chairman and now a senior majority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was an unsuccessful candidate for his party's presidential nomination this year. He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Ralph Dannheisser.

QUESTION: It's become something of an axiom that U.S. foreign policy should rise above partisan considerations. How does that play out in a situation where political power is diffused between one party in the White House — the Democrats in this case — and the other party, the Republicans, in control of Congress?

LUGAR: The U.S. Constitution gives the Senate a specific role in foreign policy in calling for two-thirds votes for ratification of treaties. But treaties are negotiated by the President or his designees — the secretary of state or other negotiators. There is a very important interplay which may lead to consultation by the President or the administration during the period of negotiations, so that ratification is more likely by the Senate at the end of the road. Or it may lead to confrontation and destruction of the whole process, undermining the administration and the credibility of the United States. So this is a very fundamental relationship that requires great skill by the President and by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Another critical point in this relationship comes in the Senate confirmation process of nominations by the President — nominations of the secretary of state and all the undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and confirmable positions and all ambassadors from the United States to over 150 countries. Each of these nominees is heard by the

Foreign Relations Committee and must receive a vote to send the nomination to the floor, and then a majority vote by the Senate. As you've noted, in recent times frequently the Senate has been of a different party than the President, and therefore once again a cooperative spirit is required. As a rule, the Senate will show deference to the president in terms of making the appointments — and clearly the President makes the appointment, not the Senate — but nevertheless, the President has to be sensitive to comments, to strong feelings by the Foreign Relations Committee and other senators in order to gain majority votes, or at least to obtain a vote at all as opposed to delay, which can lead to the United States not having representation at the ambassadorial level for long periods of time.

Now, beyond that, the President, for the conduct of American foreign policy, will always need money, and furthermore authority, in many cases. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee have hearings and then mark up legislation dealing with the authorization of measures of American foreign policy, and then the appropriations committees actually appropriate money to fund those projects that have been authorized. The power of the purse that resides with the Congress is a check and balance to the power of the President to take initiatives, to respond quickly or even to ask for a declaration of war that clearly is vested with him.

Q: Generally speaking, has this all tended to work out favorably under the situation of divided control?

LUGAR: Yes, it usually is worked out favorably, but it requires extraordinary talent and patience on the part of the President and his administration if it's to be done well. The first article of faith is, at a very early point in any major initiative he must try to co-opt the congressional leadership in a bipartisan way. He must take into his counsel as many people as possible and get as broad a base of support as possible in the planning operation so that finally, when the moments of truth come, as they always do — most policies have their good moments and usually have their disasters — the President is not going to be standing all alone. A failure to do that is almost bound to lead to political difficulty quite apart from operational difficulty, simply because members of Congress who were not consulted, who felt completely out of the loop, who maybe even were surprised by the audacity of the President, as soon as failure comes are going to be quick to point out they had nothing to do with it — as a matter of fact, felt the President was wrong all along and should never have undertaken it. And so the President then is left with very difficult pieces to pick up — and a very uncooperative and sometimes mean-spirited group of people on whom he is depending for authorization, appropriations and the rest of it. That, I think, is sort of the worst of all worlds.

Q: Have you had this experience of being blindsided, in effect, yourself, on any issues that you recall?

LUGAR: Well, I cannot recall being blindsided. I would say there are many occasions on which — with President Clinton in particular — the President, I think, has not been particularly able to gather together a broad group of supporters within his own party, quite apart from within the Republican party, for foreign policy initiatives. Occasionally, as in the very important quest we're now involved in with the IFOR (Implementation Force) process in Bosnia, the President did call together a fairly broad circle of Democrat and

Republican leaders for consultation, but it was made clear that he did not plan to seek support through affirmative votes, as, for instance, President Bush finally did prior to the Desert Storm operation. And President Clinton, with regard to Haiti, made no particular attempt to go through the consultation process. Lack of consultation leads to problems, as for instance in the case of his pledge to remove all of the IFOR American components by December 20th. A great number of people would say we didn't vote to do this and really didn't like it to begin with, and therefore are likely to leave the President much less slack. The objective of the President, I think, has got to be to get (the support of) a number of people who are prepared to share at least a portion of the load.

Q: You were talking about the U.S. troop withdrawal pledged by the President. Is that something that's likely to happen on schedule, and if not, how does that affect the relationship?

LUGAR: I don't know, and I don't want to predict that. My general supposition is that the bulk of our American troops will have completed the IFOR mission by December 20th, although maybe not much before that. But I think the formulation that I hear NATO coming up with now is that there will be a new mission after December 20th, and all of the countries involved, including our own, will have to think through who will be the components of that mission at that point. So this is still a work in progress.

Q: What do you see as some of the key recent achievements in the foreign policy area, and where do you and your party have remaining priorities?

LUGAR: Well, I believe that major achievements have occurred in world trade. NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) treaty — the Uruguay Round — these are major developments that are of enormous value in terms of American prosperity, but also in terms of international relationships. The obviating of trade wars and national conflict through economic

means — headway has been made there. I applaud likewise the Miami Summit (of the Americas, held in December 1994) as an initiative that was tremendously important, and the work that the President has done in the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) conferences. I would say that the follow-through on the Miami Summit has been very deficient and perhaps the desire of the President, and many Republicans for that matter, not to discuss NAFTA a great deal has led to muting of the promise to Chile of immediate accession and other movement toward the free trade zone. I think this has just been a period in which the movement toward greater trade has taken some blows, and some blame may lie, really, in both major parties in that respect. I think that the movement toward the revamping of NATO — that is, additional members and additional missions — proceeds on, not well publicized, but nevertheless tremendously important for the future of United States leadership and cooperation with Europe, and likewise our own security, as nations such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and I would hope, the Baltics, and other nations, may clearly come into the United States-European framework for security, for political activity, and maybe through the European Union eventually, economic activity. These initiatives take a long time to go through. I think there is a bipartisan backing there and probably likewise there will be some bipartisan opposition. The issues just have not been fleshed out. Many members are unacquainted with how large these undertakings may be, and since foreign policy has not been a major agenda item for either political party or for this session of the Congress, much still has to be said about that. But at least I see these general initiatives and beginnings as very important.

Q: You refer to both bipartisan backing there and bipartisan opposition. Is it clear where the majority view lies?

LUGAR: Oh, I have to believe that we will come down on the side of expansion of NATO after the December meeting (of NATO foreign ministers) and/or a NATO summit next year. But I don't

take it for granted. That's one reason why I and others are attempting to build a coalition of support early on, to lead that debate and to think through with members what our responsibilities might be.

Q: In terms of your own initiatives, I know you and (Democratic) Senator (Sam) Nunn have long been concerned about the Russian nuclear arsenal. I gather that's still on the front burner for you?

LUGAR: Yes, it is. As a matter of fact, we have added to the Defense Authorization bill a provision that might be called Nunn-Lugar II. It is an attempt to push ahead with those activities that have been most successful: that is, the dismantling of missiles, the actual obliteration of silos on occasion, certainly the final roundup of any tactical nuclear weapons and/or other loose elements, and then much more preoccupation with the actual physical security of the fissile material — chemical and biological materials that are in Russia and in our country — so that that leakage which is sought frequently by privateers trying to serve as conduits with either rogue states or terrorist elements does not really lead to disasters.

This has already been a part of our objective, but we're offering a good number of additional programs and authorization for expenditure of money that may go well beyond that. We are almost terrified by the experience the Japanese endured with the Aum Shinrikyo group, and the near-miss that Tokyo had of an unbelievable tragedy, and we have noted from testimony in hearings we've had that those who perpetrated the World Trade Center explosion also had in mind a chemical event in the building that would have been very deadly that simply did not come off. But the fact that it was contemplated, and the elements were there, is frightening and simply undergirds the thought we have that our first line of defense is to destroy the material or to convert highly enriched uranium through purchase to low-enriched uranium. A second line of defense is in the security measures we have been beefing up around the storage areas and perimeters around

countries, for instance, with Poland, to detect radiation of vehicles going back and forth across the borders. A third defense, if we fail in the first two, is a much more adequate training system in this country so that people understand defenses against chemical and biological elements quite apart from nuclear if the worst should happen.

Q: Are these initiatives, again, being pushed primarily in the Congress, or is there cooperation between Congress and the administration?

LUGAR: Well, there's cooperation and it's been substantial. (Senators) Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici and I have met with Secretary (of Defense William) Perry and (Assistant Secretary) Ash Carter and likewise with (Deputy Secretary Charles) Curtis over in the Department of Energy. They have quite a stake in this — and we've been working closely with the administration people. It's a bipartisan effort, obviously, with Senator Nunn's and my partnership and Senator Dominici, who is very important on the appropriations side. ●

IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER SHIFT ON FOREIGN POLICY

An interview with Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton

The majority party in the House of Representatives governs; the minority simply reacts, says Hamilton. And with both sides still adjusting to their new roles in the wake of the 1994 elections that put the Republicans in charge after 40 years of Democratic control, the record of this Congress in foreign affairs has been “rather meager,” he says. He portrays the Democrats’ role as trying to “head off” Republican initiatives “that we thought...placed barriers in the way of American foreign policy.” Hamilton, a Democrat from Indiana, is a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and now the senior minority member of the successor International Relations Committee. He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Ralph Dannheisser.

QUESTION: How has the concept that U.S. foreign policy should somehow rise above politics worked out in an era when control of Congress and the White House has so often been split between Democrats and Republicans?

HAMILTON: It is important, I think, to remember that the broad themes of American foreign policy stay very much the same from one administration to the other and are supported by both parties — support for NATO, for example; for the Middle East peace process; for a good relationship with Japan; trying to manage the Chinese relationship. You certainly see differences of tactics, you see a lot of strong rhetoric from time to time, but the bipartisan tradition with regard to the major themes of American foreign policy since World War II is fairly impressive. Now that’s not to say we don’t have some differences. We have a lot of them, but there is something to the claim that, in the case of foreign policy, “politics stops at the water’s edge.”

Q: You mentioned some of the areas of compatibility — regarding NATO and so on — but you also alluded to differences. Where do you see some of those?

HAMILTON: You see differences today — I think the Republicans generally are pushing harder for

NATO enlargement, for example, wanting the President to go faster. There’s a lot of criticism of the President’s China policy that comes from both Democrats and Republicans, concern about human rights and most favored nation trade status for China.

You see a lot of differences today with regard to the support for international institutions — by and large, the Republicans being less willing to support money for peacekeeping, international financial institutions and the like. You certainly see a move by the Republicans today to cut back on the total number of resources going to international relations. We’ve had a sharp drop, for example, in foreign aid that has really gone on for almost a decade now — cutbacks in monies for embassies, for peacekeeping, for international institutions, for consulates — declining resources.

Q: That certainly affects the situation with the United Nations.

HAMILTON: Very much so. We have a major concern in the Congress today, shared by both Democrats and Republicans, about the role of the United Nations, and there is much support for fundamental change or reform, and a willingness to link the payment of U.S. assessments to the United Nations to such reform.

Q: You referred to differences within the party, as well as between the parties, on China policy and other issues. To what extent do those intraparty differences come into play, and how do they get resolved?

HAMILTON: Well, I think that unanimity on foreign policy is very difficult to achieve and the differences sometimes break on partisan lines. But not always, and you frequently will find differences within a party. In the Democratic Party today you find very wide differences on the trade issue, for example. You don't resolve those issues immediately. There are strongly held feelings on both sides. NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) was an issue that split the Democratic Party rather decisively. So was GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Those things happen within the parties. How do you resolve them? Well, you resolve them by debate and discussion within the caucuses and endless numbers of meetings among ourselves, and between ourselves and the administration. And sometimes you don't resolve them. There are a lot of problems that cannot be solved through discussion and dialogue. You just keep at it. And those differences carry over into public debate and into the elections.

Q: The House was consistently in Democratic control from your first term in 1964 through the 1994 election. During that time you worked up to the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Suddenly now you find yourself on the minority side; how has that shift affected the way you work and what you're able to accomplish?

HAMILTON: It's a difficult adjustment, having spent my congressional life in the majority and then suddenly being put into the minority. I don't know that we've worked through that adjustment even yet. The majority controls the agenda. In the House of Representatives, I think probably more than in the Senate, the majority governs. The minority does not initiate anything; the minority reacts. That's the difference. And so we've had to try to adapt to the role of reacting to the Republican proposals. I'm not sure we've done it all that effectively, but I think that's the difference.

Q: How do you find the Republicans have handled the job of being in the majority and dealing with a reactive minority?

HAMILTON: I think they, too, have gone through a period of adjustment. They have had to deal not just with the minority in the House, they have had to deal with a Republican majority in the Senate that often times doesn't agree with them, and they've had to deal with an administration which is of a different party. Looking back over the last year or two, it has not been a terribly productive period in terms of foreign policy legislation, as both of us have tried to adjust to our new roles. The record is rather meager. A lot of things passed one house or the other — a lot of rhetoric, a lot of activity, but in terms of bills enacted into law, very few really that have had any impact of consequence.

Q: What do you see within this meager context as some significant achievements — if any — during the current session?

HAMILTON: I really don't see any significant foreign policy achievements in the Congress recently. From my standpoint, we (Democrats) have been playing defense. We've been trying to head off a lot of things that we thought were destructive and that placed barriers in the way of American foreign policy. The resources issue is one of these — in other words, this constant effort to cut back resources that go into international relations I think has made the conduct of American foreign policy more difficult.

The unwillingness of the Congress to approve the deployment of forces to Bosnia is another example. We didn't block it, we didn't approve it. We just didn't do anything, in fact. I think American foreign policy is stronger, sturdier, if you have agreement between the executive and the legislative branches. We didn't have that on Bosnia. We really did not have it on Haiti. The President acted on his own in putting American forces into Haiti. The Republicans never really agreed to that, and they still don't like it. They're trying to find ways to reduce the impact of the President's policy

in Haiti. So I think the Democratic role here has been to try to reduce what we see as the harmful consequences of Republican foreign policy efforts.

Q: What are the main priorities you and your party have at this point in the foreign policy area?

HAMILTON: I think the President has grown into a foreign policy leader, and he protects the national interest of the United States. I think he's had a string of foreign policy successes — in Russia, in Bosnia, in Haiti, in China, in the Middle East, in Korea, in Mexico to name a few. All of these victories are fragile. I don't know that there's any such thing as a permanent victory in foreign policy; any of them could unravel. But it seems to me he's had a string of rather impressive foreign policy achievements. Coupled with that, I think, are the successful efforts he's had to open up the world economies and trade.

At the G-7 meeting (of the heads of state of the seven major industrial countries) recently, he was looked upon as the dominant figure at that meeting. That certainly was not true a year or two or three years ago. But the world leaders now recognize that he has grown in the job, and I think he has.

Q: What are the things on Congress' plate that haven't been dealt with and need to be done?

HAMILTON: I think it's an ongoing effort. I don't look upon it as a radical change, but we want to see reforms continue in Russia. So far so good, but always recognize the fragility of the situation in Russia today. So American policy confronts real challenges there. I think managing the Chinese relationship is probably the most difficult foreign policy challenge that we have. And we have to keep the Middle East peace process going, today under very different circumstances with a new Israeli prime minister. I think managing the relationship with Japan has gone through a period of considerable improvement in the past few months, but that will require vigilance as well. And I think we've made a lot of progress on halting the spread of nuclear weapons, but that's

an ongoing effort too. So when I look at the agenda today, I see more the opportunity to build on what I think are some significant advances in the recent past, but we've got to keep at it, we've got to keep building on it.

Q: Do you realistically see much of this sort of bipartisan building effort in the immediate months ahead, with the presidential election looming?

HAMILTON: I think American foreign policy will go into a kind of a period of abeyance almost for the next few months as we go through this (election year) debate. The President may be called upon to act in emergency situations that arise, but you're not going to see any major changes in American foreign policy on these areas that I've talked about in the next few months. I'd be surprised if you did.

Q: On the one hand, you say Congress has been largely stalemated; meanwhile you're giving the President good marks in a number of areas for advancing American interests. Does that suggest that the executive branch can act effectively on its own in a lot of these areas without anything happening in Congress?

HAMILTON: Presidents always have very wide discretion in the conduct of American foreign policy, but it is not a total discretion. The President is the chief actor in American foreign policy. He always has been, and he will be. But he must pay attention to what goes on in the Congress, and he is in a stronger position if he proceeds with the support of the Congress on any given foreign policy initiative. It is difficult for him to succeed if he has the strong opposition of the Congress. If he has a Congress that is split, as has been the case, for example, on Bosnia, or Haiti, then he can proceed.

Congress often likes to second-guess the President on foreign policy. In other words, we don't like to vote to authorize troops to go into Bosnia, or to Haiti, or to Somalia, or almost anywhere else you can mention, with the exception of the Gulf War. What we like to do is to let the President take the

lead and then we say to him if he succeeds, “Good work, Mr. President,” and if he fails, we criticize him.

Congress doesn’t want, in my view at least, to step up to its responsibility under the Constitution and be a partner in the foreign policy-making process.

Q: That’s kind of the flip side of something Senator (Richard) Lugar mentioned about the need for the President to take Congress into the process early on when he’s devising a policy.

HAMILTON: I think that’s a very important part of the President’s job. He has to try to lead not just the country but lead the Congress. And sometimes the Congress can’t be led. Take the Mexico bailout situation. He came to the Congress, he pleaded with the Congress, he got the support of the leadership of the Congress —

Republican and Democrat — but he couldn’t get a majority support for what he tried to do. That, I don’t think was a failure of his leadership. It was a failure of followership by the Congress, and I think the President has turned out to be right about the judgment on Mexico. The Congress was wrong.

So there are times, I think, when the President has not consulted as closely as he should with the Congress, and it is his obligation to consult and to try to bring along the leadership. There are many times the Congress doesn’t want to be brought along. We certainly didn’t want to be brought along on Bosnia. He had dozens and dozens of meetings with members of Congress on Bosnia. At the end of the day, the Congress stood aside and said, “We’re not going to approve it, we’re not going to stop it. Go ahead.” And he did. ●

PROMOTING THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA IN CONGRESS

An interview with Patrick Griffin, former Assistant to President Clinton for Legislative Affairs

With the end of the Cold War, the absence of “a single understood external threat to national security” and the increasing focus on domestic concerns make it more difficult for the administration to gain the support of both Democrats and Republicans in Congress for the President’s foreign policy goals, says Griffin. As the chief White House liaison with Congress from December 1993 to February 1996, Griffin sought congressional support for the President’s policies on China, Bosnia, Haiti and Mexico. An experienced congressional observer, he worked in the early 1980s on the staffs of the Senate Budget Committee and the Democratic Policy Committee and as an aide to Democratic Senator Robert Byrd, who at the time was Senate Minority Leader. This interview was conducted by Managing Editor Wendy Ross.

QUESTION: What is the role of the Congressional Liaison Office at the White House in helping develop the President’s foreign policy legislation?

GRIFFIN: My responsibility was to develop with my colleagues an overall strategy for advancing in the U.S. Congress the President’s agenda, both domestically and in the area of foreign policy. I worked directly with the congressional leaders in the House and Senate in both parties, to the extent that was appropriate, in order to implement legislation. I also worked to keep the President’s message alive in his own party.

Q: Several government departments that are involved in foreign policy have their own congressional liaison staffs, including the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office. Do these staffs consult regularly and coordinate their approach to problems?

GRIFFIN: Yes. Let me give you an example. When President Clinton for the first time had to make a decision on whether to grant China most favored nation trading status (MFN), there was a meeting that included the Secretary of State, as well as top officials from the National Security Council and the intelligence community, and

other relevant persons. Once that policy was formulated, another process was developed which involved the legislative teams of the concerned agencies to organize our strategy for executing the President’s decision.

It was a very controversial decision. The President, upon reflection, had modified his earlier position on what he was going to do on MFN status for China. In so doing, while he temporarily angered some of his traditional allies, including some of the Democratic leadership in the House and the Senate, he was able to build a majority coalition among Democrats and Republicans who supported his proposal. I then worked with the congressional liaison staffs of the interested agencies and departments in concert with this bipartisan group to secure the votes we needed in order to protect the president’s position.

Q: On the issue of Bosnia, many in Congress were apprehensive about U.S. involvement, while others wanted the United States to get involved. How did you go about seeking congressional support for the President’s Bosnia policy?

GRIFFIN: Early in his administration, the President, I believe, courageously faced up to his responsibility to figure out a new U.S. policy on Bosnia. The issues involved were very complex

and sensitive. There were factions led by Democrats opposing different aspects of the President's policy. We worked to contain those problems on a case-by-case basis. When it came to finally getting support for the policy we are operating under right now, the President sought to get the endorsement of the bipartisan leadership. And I thought Senator Bob Dole, then Majority Leader, was courageous in coming forward and supporting the President.

Senator Dole's inability to contain his troops was not only problematic for him but also for us. It spoke to the whole dynamic that had emerged between the executive branch and the Congress with respect to foreign policy at this particular time in history that had nothing to do with partisanship. Even the leaders of the Congress could not rely on their troops taking a proactive position on international affairs. The tendency to turn inward and become domestically oriented was non-partisan and compelling to the point that while Senator Dole was absolutely instrumental in helping the President, he could not deliver his Republicans the way he might have wanted.

Q: You were the chief White House liaison with Congress in 1994, when Republicans for the first time in 40 years took control of both the House and Senate. How did the results of the mid-term legislative elections impact on your efforts to deal with Congress?

GRIFFIN: I think the seeds of the complexities of the relationship between the executive branch and the Congress on foreign policy were set, back in 1990 and 1992, before the mid-term elections. I think the end of the Cold War, with the wall coming down in Europe, ended one era and created a very inward-looking dynamic in the American electorate. It manifested itself, in part, in an anti-incumbent vote, throwing out the old timers and electing new members with strong domestic agendas.

President Clinton benefited from this phenomenon as well. President Bush, I believe, lost the 1992 presidential election because of the

strong effects of these changes in voter sentiment. Along with President Clinton being elected, there came a new set of Democrats with an inward perspective that only got reinforced in the 1994 mid-term legislative elections (for 435 House members and a third of the Senate seats). So a trend was developing that was very domestically driven with little sensitivity to an international perspective. Managing foreign policy was further compounded by the change of power in the Congress from Democrats to Republicans as a result of those elections.

Further, the absence of a single understood external threat to national security following the end of the Cold War made it difficult to develop a single foreign policy framework that could be used to organize Democrats and Republicans.

Q: Can you give examples of how the current climate makes it difficult for the administration to get support from Congress on foreign policy issues?

GRIFFIN: Absolutely. One example of the problems it creates was the Mexico bailout.

The President, after being briefed one night by Treasury Secretary Rubin, who had just been sworn in, said we needed to act to stabilize the Mexican financial situation. The President was right there, ready to go. But I felt there would not be sufficient support among the rank and file in the Congress to support this proposal.

The President recognized this as well and asked the four congressional leaders — Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senator Dole — to come to the White House the next morning to discuss how to proceed.

They all gave their support, which was very courageous of them. But it didn't take long for all of us to realize that this would be impossible to do legislatively. The President said we still had to act, and he found a way to do that through an executive order, his own presidential authority,

thereby circumventing the need for congressional action.

Q: Are there other examples?

GRIFFIN: A particularly harrowing issue, from a congressional viewpoint, was the September 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti, which had the elements of politics, diplomacy and the military.

We were in the process of coming up to the 1994 mid-term election and we were considering an invasion in a part of the world which was not widely viewed by Congress as a place where we needed to be. The President said promoting democracy was worth the risk — and once again the President was decisive in wanting to move forward. It wasn't a decision I wanted him to make from a congressional point of view, but it was clear he was not going to back off.

To the credit of the people who devised the strategy, it turned out to be very successful. But think about going into an election with the prospect of a potential invasion of a country where almost nobody in Congress wanted us to be in the first place. I sat there and bit my fingers, and it worked — it was done brilliantly. It's a testimony to the President's courage.

Q: In terms of foreign policy, where does the power lie — with the President or with the Congress?

GRIFFIN: My sense is that it rests equally in both the executive and legislative branches of government with the advantage shifting back and forth. I think the executive branch has the advantage at the front end to formulate the policy and execute it. I think the Congress has continually attempted to increase its leverage by the use of the War Powers Act (passed by Congress in 1973, over a presidential veto, as a way to limit the president's powers to commit U.S. forces abroad without congressional approval). My judgment, in retrospect, is that the President still has the upper hand in foreign policy matters because he is able to frame the message to the American people outside of Congress, and Congress still has to get super majorities in both bodies to overturn a presidential veto.

However, the Congress has absolute advantage in the appropriations process. We saw that most stridently when Congress ultimately cut off funding for the war in Vietnam. That power to cut off funding is always there as a mallet that Congress can wield and that the President contemplates before going into a conflict. He knows that the Congress has that authority ultimately (to cut off funding), and he anticipates that in formulating his policy, and he worries about it once the policy is underway. That was true in Haiti and in some of the discussions in Bosnia in terms of the President setting time lines, meeting those time lines, containing the mission, knowing that the Congress could come in and start affecting his policies through the appropriations process. He anticipates their concerns as much as possible in the formulation and execution of his policies, thereby minimizing much of their resistance. ●

CONGRESS: PARTISAN BUT NOT ISOLATIONIST

By Peter W. Rodman

The Republican Congress is not isolationist, contends the author, despite fears to the contrary which are “far beyond what the facts warrant.” Rodman, who served in the administrations of Republican Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush, says that while there are differences between the Republican and Democratic parties, they share “a strong middle ground that represents continuity with respect to the most important elements of America’s role in the world.”

Rodman served as a Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He is now Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and a Senior Editor of National Review magazine.

In all of the industrial democracies, the end of the Cold War brought a sigh of relief and a comforting illusion in many quarters that domestic economic and social concerns could now be the sole preoccupation of government. This was not totally wrong, given the more benign security environment following the collapse of the Soviet empire. But, of course, peace and security and national independence are not automatically guaranteed; they must be maintained by effort and vigilance. And a special responsibility rests with the United States because many other nations rely on it to play a leading role in world affairs. Fear of American isolationism is profoundly unsettling to many other nations and destabilizing to the international order.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that recent political developments in the United States have revived such fears far beyond what the facts warrant. The Republican resurgence in Congress in 1994 transformed American politics. It is not unusual in recent history to have a President from one party and a Congress led by the other, but we have not had the present line-up — a Democratic President and a Republican Congress — since a brief period in the late 1940s.

The good news is that the term “isolationist” is still a negative epithet in American political discourse; it is still not a respectable position. The bad news

is that the epithet has been tossed around rather loosely in our recent domestic political battles, sometimes for self-serving purposes (including by President Clinton), and the effect may be misleading to America’s friends looking on anxiously from abroad.

The Republican Congress is not isolationist. Nor are the American people. There have been some exuberant debates and controversies in the last three years, but the issues in those debates and controversies turn out, on inspection, to be more complicated than the conventional wisdom has it. The obituaries for American internationalism are, once again, premature.

REPUBLICAN POLITICS

Both political parties in America have their demons to wrestle with. Grassroots pressures in the country are more concentrated on domestic priorities than before. The Democratic Party is the home of many protectionist elements and of a residue of liberal isolationism left over from the Vietnam era. Many Republicans are happy to revert to their pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism now that the Communist dragon has been slain; this attitude was reflected in Patrick Buchanan’s presidential candidacy and in the mood of many of the new Republican members of Congress elected since 1990.

But the first point to stress about the Republicans is that the party leadership remains solidly internationalist. Bob Dole, former Senate majority leader and now the leading Republican Party candidate for the presidency, and other key Senate Republican leaders like John McCain and Richard Lugar are clearly in the tradition of post-World War II bipartisan internationalism. Among the other Republican presidential aspirants, all except Buchanan were, as well. Senator Phil Gramm is an ardent champion of free trade. General Colin Powell is an internationalist. The decisiveness of Buchanan's defeat in the primaries ensured that the Republican platform, and the party position in the autumn presidential campaign, will reflect this internationalist philosophy.

In the House of Representatives, Speaker Newt Gingrich and Representatives Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Christopher Cox, who chairs the House Republican Policy Committee, are among the party leaders on foreign affairs issues. They are in the same internationalist tradition. They, not the freshmen, set the party's policy.

And it is difficult to characterize that policy as isolationist when it includes:

- pressure to increase U.S. defense spending, based on a concern about the world's growing instabilities and the importance of U.S. commitments;
- ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II);
- support for repeal of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which attempts to limit the President's authority as commander-in-chief;
- advocacy of enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);
- support for a firm deterrent posture in the Taiwan Strait during the mini-crisis last spring at the time of the elections in Taiwan; and

— support for free trade, as evidenced by the Republican backing that ensured passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In general, Republicans have stressed the commitment of the United States to its traditional alliances and espoused a more sober, geopolitical view of the emerging power of Russia and China. Whatever the tactical disagreements between the President and Congress, and often they have been only tactical, the list just recited shows the absurdity of the "isolationist" label.

The Republicans did assault President Clinton's policy more fiercely on some issues, but they chose their targets carefully — namely, United Nations peacekeeping and foreign assistance. Whatever one thinks of the merits, these two issues are hardly the core of U.S. foreign policy.

Economic theory has long since rediscovered that economic development comes from policies that unleash the productive forces within developing societies and attract private capital — not from official development aid. Cold War-era theories of "blocking the Soviets" or promoting "take-off" by official aid turned out to be not so effective. The decline of American public support for foreign aid has many causes — including a perennial populist mistrust of any "give-away" to foreigners — but the intellectual bankruptcy of much of the original economic and political rationale for foreign aid does not help. The Republican Congress, in the end, passed a foreign aid bill (with many conservative members voting for it for the first time ever) after trimming it and redirecting it to programs in countries in which the Congress perceived a U.S. strategic stake.

As for U.N. peacekeeping efforts, the congressional mood reflected the strongly negative popular reaction to President Clinton's initial stumbles in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti in 1993-1994. Especially disillusioning was the fiasco in Somalia when the corpse of a U.S. soldier was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in front of TV cameras.

THE PUBLIC MOOD

The American public's support for Desert Storm — the 1991 Gulf War that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation — demonstrated the degree to which it has recovered from the so-called Vietnam trauma. The problem more recently has been less a problem of isolationism than a lack of confidence in the interventions proposed or conducted by President Clinton. This explains why his later interventions in Haiti, at the end of 1994, and in Bosnia, at the end of 1995, rightly or wrongly, had such little congressional and public backing. Fairly or unfairly, he was no longer getting the benefit of the doubt. And in large part, the early stumbles were not just bad luck but also the consequences of an ill-conceived enthusiasm for humanitarian interventionism and a misplaced faith in limited, incremental uses of force. The public seems to require not only humane motives but some showing of American strategic interest. And they react badly to failure.

The ambiguous response by Congress to Bosnia, after the Dayton accords, was the product of this mood. When President Clinton dispatched 30,000 U.S. combat troops as part of the international Implementation Force (IFOR), both houses passed non-binding resolutions criticizing or giving only tepid support to the President's Bosnia policy but offering moral support to the troops. In both houses, resolutions that would have cut off funds for the deployment (resolutions not supported by the Republican leadership) failed.

Republicans opposed the troop deployment for varying reasons. A few members avowed openly isolationist sentiments, saying they cared not a

whit for NATO or NATO solidarity. But others voted "no" because they had long preferred a different policy in Bosnia, namely to lift the U.N. arms embargo and arm and train the Bosnians to defend themselves. Again, whatever the merits of this Republican alternative, it represented an alternative form of involvement in Bosnia, not an aversion to involvement. The administration's diplomatic success at Dayton had been preceded by nearly three years of fluctuating and largely ineffectual U.S. and Western policies, for which President Clinton was still paying a political price. In retrospect, it is also clear that the Republican Party, as a party, did not seriously attempt to thwart the President's policy over Bosnia with anywhere near the destructive ferocity that had characterized the Democratic Congresses in opposition to Republican Presidents in the 1970s and 1980s over policies in Indochina and Central America.

President Clinton and his administration have clearly learned some lessons from their initial mistakes. Much of the exuberant "multilateralism" and enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention is gone. This is a good thing. A policy grounded in U.S. strategic interest and support for our traditional alliances has a better chance of being sustained by the public. The Republicans, for their part, have voted decisively in the presidential primaries to maintain the internationalist course that they championed throughout the postwar period. There are differences between the two parties, and differences between President Clinton and Bob Dole, but they all occupy a strong middle ground that represents continuity with respect to the most important elements of America's role in the world. ●

NEW CONGRESSIONAL ASSERTIVENESS IN FOREIGN POLICY

By Jeremy D. Rosner

The current 104th Congress is setting historical records for the vigor of its oppositional behavior to the administration's foreign policy initiatives, says Jeremy D. Rosner, Senior Associate at Washington's Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of 'The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch and National Security. Rosner decries what he calls "the rising politicization of foreign policy" and the "new stridency" in congressional barrages against foreign aid and "virtually all things multilateral." Rosner, who teaches at the School of International Service at The American University in Washington, served from 1993 to 1994 as Special Assistant to President Clinton in charge of legislative affairs on the staff of the National Security Council.

Virtually all American Presidents since George Washington have found their foreign policy efforts complicated by the U.S. Constitution's broad grant of independent authority over foreign affairs to the Congress, which has control over the purse, the power to approve treaties and appointments and legislative authority over trade and other external matters. From the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations in 1920 to this year's cuts in the U.S. foreign aid budget, American legislators throughout the century have shaped the nation's role in the world, both directly and indirectly, both for good and ill.

Against this backdrop, the unruly and at times alarming foreign policy record of the newest Congress is not wholly unprecedented. The end of the Cold War virtually invited Congress to flex its muscles on foreign policy. Post-Cold War legislators quickly sensed they would risk paying less of a price at the ballot box for bucking the President's leadership abroad. Their new foreign policy assertiveness showed itself as soon as the old Soviet flag was last lowered from the top of the Kremlin on Christmas Day, 1991.

From the end of World War II until that date, American Presidents had prevailed with Congress on a majority of the national security issues on which the White House declared a position. But during 1992, President Bush won fewer than 50

percent of such votes in Congress — a stunning statistic, given the respect in foreign policy Bush had just earned as a result of the U.S.-led coalition victory in the Gulf War. Today there is a new stridency in congressional barrages against foreign aid, international financial institutions, foreign trade, peacekeeping, the United Nations, and virtually all things multilateral.

It is important to keep Congress's new activism on foreign affairs in proper perspective. Congress does influence the direction of American national security policy, but it cannot steer the ship of state. The President is the commander-in-chief and the White House has the advantage when it comes to formulating the nation's international policies and conducting its diplomacy. There are only five instances in this century in which Congress forced adoption of national security legislation despite a presidential veto, and none since the 1986 imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa over President Ronald Reagan's objections.

It is significant that despite Congress's new assertiveness, President Clinton has still won approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) accord, obtained new aid for the Middle East peace process and for democratization in the states of the former Soviet bloc, deployed troops to Haiti and

Bosnia, preserved the stabilizing presence of American troops in Europe and East Asia, and secured ratification of the START II Treaty on strategic arms reduction.

Further, the assertiveness of the new Congress generally has been strongest on issues that are less geostrategically important for the United States. Congress has imposed deep cuts or policy restrictions on development aid, population programs, and United Nations peacekeeping, but has been relatively deferential on matters involving Russia, China, and the Mideast.

Yet something has changed on Capitol Hill, and it is not just the dramatic switch after the 1994 elections to Republican control of Congress for the first time in four decades. This 104th American Congress is setting historical records for the vigor of its oppositional behavior to the administration's foreign policy initiatives.

Examples are legion. Congress loudly criticized (although it refrained from either authorizing or prohibiting) U.S. military deployments to Bosnia and Haiti. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, North Carolina's Jesse Helms, called foreign aid "rat-hole" spending and stalled approval of key arms control treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention. Texas Senator Phil Gramm, briefly a presidential aspirant and former chair of a panel that funds U.S. diplomacy, slashed the budget of the State Department and its already-late payments to the U.N.

An especially worrisome aspect of the new Congress is its apparent tendency not to heed the views of important American allies on a number of pressing issues. For example, America's European allies were deeply concerned by Congress's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to force the U.S. into unilateral violation of the international arms embargo on Bosnia. Relations with Mexico have been strained by congressional (as well as state-level) attacks on both illegal and legal immigration.

One striking trend in the new Congress is the rising politicization of foreign policy. During the

Cold War there was at least some effort to minimize party differences on foreign affairs, and Presidents typically were able to get the support of majorities from both political parties in Congress on most key national security votes. While that pattern began to fade as early as the 1970s, the current Congress has reached historic lows in bipartisanship. The percentage of bipartisan votes (votes on which the President's position received support from a majority of both parties) on key national security issues now has fallen to about 15 percent.

This general trend toward partisanship coexists with the rise of odd coalitions on certain issues, such as NAFTA and the granting of most-favored-nation trading status for China, on which populist and protectionist factions in each party have joined forces. Such intra-party splits are especially notable within the Republican party, which has lost the glue of anti-communism that held its isolationist and internationalist branches together during the Cold War.

The behavior of Congress on foreign policy has also become more erratic. At one point last year, House Speaker Newt Gingrich unexpectedly suggested the U.S. should recognize Taiwan, then only a few days later reversed his position. Despite decades of support for trade liberalization efforts such as NAFTA, former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole complained last November that the U.S. was "choking" on free trade accords. Last February, second-term Republican Representative John Linder of Georgia voted for provisions aimed at adding new Central European states to NATO, only to call for NATO's dismantling ten months later during the debate over the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia.

Several factors have added fuel to this fiery congressional mood on foreign policy. One is the rate of change in the membership of Congress. After large waves of new members in 1992 and 1994, over half of the House of Representatives now has been elected since the Berlin Wall fell. Retirement announcements this year ensure the pace of turnover will remain high. The

backgrounds and outlooks of the newer members testify to the fact that they were elected on the basis of domestic rather than foreign concerns. Compared to more senior members, the newcomers have lower rates of military service and distinctly different views on foreign affairs. They tend to be less supportive of foreign aid and free trade. New members of Congress were once expected to be quiet and obedient, but today's newcomers have helped lead several revolts on foreign policy issues, such as on the Bosnia deployment and the peso assistance package to Mexico, and often defied the foreign policy positions of not only the President, but also their own leaders, such as Dole and Gingrich.

Just as Congress is seeing the arrival of more extreme voices on foreign policy, it is losing many of its most moderate voices in both parties. In the Senate, for example, the list of retiring members includes Democrats Sam Nunn of Georgia and James Exon of Nebraska, and Republicans William Cohen of Maine and Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas — highly regarded senators who were seen as among the more centrist voices on foreign and defense policy in their respective parties. This “emptying-out of the middle” reflects broader trends in American politics. The realignment of the American south toward the Republican Party and rising public disenchantment with both major parties have pushed the congressional center of gravity among both congressional Democrats and Republicans toward the extremes. Especially in the House, the Democratic leadership lies to the

left of the party's rank and file, while the new Republican majority has given that party a more highly ideological set of leaders.

Congress's new posture on foreign policy presents real challenges, not only for the current administration, but also for those that will follow. In the face of low public concern over foreign affairs and mounting pressures to reduce the federal budget deficit, it will remain difficult to persuade Congress to allocate sufficient funds for many aspects of foreign policy and defense. It also will be hard for administrations to keep partisan congressional pressures from pushing American policy back and forth between extremes, especially with regard to China, Russia, and other states with which the U.S. needs to pursue patient strategies despite complex and often difficult relations.

The Constitution created “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy,” wrote the late scholar Edward S. Corwin. And it is hardly realistic to think that the United States could exist without policy tensions between the Congress and the White House over foreign affairs. The two branches can, however, channel that struggle in more or less effective ways. The challenge for both future Congresses and future Presidents will be to respect each other's institutional prerogatives on foreign policy while ensuring that the nation can respond energetically to its most important security opportunities and challenges. ©

HOW LOBBYISTS INFLUENCE FOREIGN POLICY

By Jacqui S. Porth, Contributing Editor

In the U.S. capital, known as “a city of lobbyists,” more than 67,000 people are now employed in activities related to influencing or monitoring government actions.

These individuals represent an industry that has more than quadrupled in a little over three decades and an enterprise which garners annual revenues in excess of \$8,000 million in Washington alone. The term lobbyist includes those who work in lobbying, law, and public relations firms.

Who are these highly paid people and what are they doing for their clients who want to influence Congress on foreign policy issues?

Traditionally, lobbyists approach members of Congress with a specially crafted message on behalf of their clients and take back to them carefully analyzed information. They devise political strategies and tactics to support, initiate or block legislation, or to change laws already in effect. In some cases they define issues, write speeches or draft language for proposed legislation in the hopes that it will become law. The credible lobbyist is the consummate Washington “insider” who — with one telephone call — can obtain an appointment for a client with the chairman or key staff member of a congressional committee.

One such lobbyist is Thomas Hale Boggs, who works for what the *National Journal* describes as the “power house” Washington law lobbying firm of Patton, Boggs. Part of his firm’s *raison d’être* is lobbying Capitol Hill, and its connections are considered superlative. Boggs — whose mother “Lindy” and father Hale were both members of Congress — is said to understand Congress better than many past and present U.S. legislators.

Boggs says even very sophisticated foreign clients with interests located in the United States “for the most part do not have much of an understanding of how the federal system works here between the Congress and the Executive” branch of government, nor do they understand the political relationship between the state and federal systems. He stresses to them the importance of dealing with Congress, because many of them think they can achieve their goals simply by approaching the White House.

Boggs points out that a lot of time is spent telling the client what can and cannot be done, what obstacles must be overcome, and what costs will be incurred.

He notes that a number of foreign companies are opposed to the Iran sanctions bill — which would impose sanctions on nations that invest in Iran or Libya or that export certain technologies to those two nations, both of which have been accused of sponsoring terrorism — but the companies are not willing to say so publicly or to lobby against the measure as it makes its way through both chambers of Congress. They prefer to have their governments address the issue or have a trade association deal with it, he explains. Major trading partners, such as Japan, “very rarely” rely on a U.S. lobbyist directly, he adds, but will turn, instead, to an American company, bank or institution to enlist the assistance of a lobbyist.

Countries have varying reasons for hiring a lobbyist, Boggs says. Smaller or emerging nations, he says, are frequently only interested in gaining publicity for a visiting head of state or in attracting the attention of the administration and media. Although this is a “valid” function, he says, his

firm does not engage in “general representation,” which tends to focus on promoting the client’s country or leaders.

Some of the issues that a lobbyist handles, such as defense matters, can be “very technical,” he says, and in cases related to foreign military sales, for example, the client is hiring “expertise not influence.” In taking on a specific task, Boggs says, a competent lobbyist must know quickly if it can be done, although the results “are not necessarily predictable.”

According to Donald Massey, senior vice president of Fleishman Hillard, Inc., a public relations firm, foreign governments have “a real interest” in Congress because they are “affected by what Congress does.” They are interested, he explains, because members of Congress “have a lot to say about foreign policy” and can carry out their legislative duties in ways that promote the interests of certain foreign governments. The better governments communicate their interests to Congress, he notes, “the better off they are.” And a lobbyist, Massey adds, can help elevate a nation’s profile in the United States through what happens in Congress, which he describes as “a magnet for press attention.”

In the area of foreign policy-making, Massey says, most of the influence of lobbyists is brought to bear on such issues as the foreign aid bill and trade matters including intellectual property rights. But lobbyists also are hired by foreign clients when a nation is criticized in Congress for violations including human rights abuses and infraction of trade regulations.

If a country does not have a cogent case to make, Massey says, there is nothing a lobbyist can do. And if a rogue nation like Libya or Iran “is in the bull’s eye of American foreign policy” the targeted nation will be isolated and contradicted “at every turn,” no matter what course of action a lobbyist might pursue, he says.

But on some issues, he explains, if a congressional office is besieged with masses of information, a

lobbyist can help “shape a message” in a way that gets attention and “priority.” Doing that, he says, “is a major accomplishment” for a client.

A lobbyist plays an important role in interpreting what congressional action means for the client. Even personnel of foreign embassies representing democratic governments frequently have little understanding of the American system of government and what it means to operate under a “separation of powers concept” because they are accustomed to government under parliamentary democracies.

It is difficult for them to understand how congressional actions can block something that the U.S. President or Secretary of State has requested, Massey says. Explaining the process, providing strategic counsel, drafting letters, writing fact sheets and “helping make the case” are all part of “a constructive role” lobbyists undertake, Massey adds.

Lobbying efforts at the local level by organized ethnic and immigrant groups have been bolstered by the use of new technologies including electronic mail and facsimile machines, and Massey notes that the advent of “the information age has certainly made it easier to mobilize large groups of people.”

For example, Mexican-American groups are publicizing their views on border migration issues, and other groups — among them the Armenian Caucus and Greek-Americans — wield considerable power on Capitol Hill. Coalitions of groups that share similar interests and common purposes have been particularly successful in influencing Congress on foreign policy issues.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has been described as one of the preeminent foreign policy lobbying groups because of its unity of purpose, membership size, and the high level of education and political involvement of its constituency.

The two main items on AIPAC’s current legislative agenda are foreign aid — Israel receives \$3,000

million in U.S. aid annually — and passage of the Iran sanctions bill.

The role of Washington lobbyists, special interest groups and grass roots lobbying organizations was spotlighted during debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which was a major preoccupation of Congress for several years in the early 1990s. The *Nation* magazine describes NAFTA as the “perfect issue” for lobbyists because it was “highly technical” and replete with “arcane” details. According to Boggs, the “most effective lobbying came from U.S. companies that had an interest” in the issue.

Robert Strauss, with the corporate law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Huer, and Feld, met, according to a report in the *National Journal*, with a key group of undecided Democrats shortly before the House voted on NAFTA. During that meeting, Strauss — a former Ambassador to Moscow, U.S. Special Trade Representative (USTR) and Democratic National Committee Chairman — reportedly persuaded at least one representative to vote in favor of NAFTA.

The lobbying sector earned large sums during the NAFTA debate, with the Mexican government and business interests said to have spent some \$25 million to secure the pact. Registered foreign agent Burson-Marsteller took in a reported \$5 million, according to the *Legal Times*, and New York lobby law firm Shearman and Sterling earned a similar amount. The law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton, also of New York, collected more than \$4 million from the Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.

Upon retirement, many members of Congress themselves go from Capitol Hill to jobs in the lobbying sector. They include former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker, who now heads the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell, and former Indiana Senator Birch Bayh, who joined the general law firm of Bayh,

Connaughton, and Malone. The Capitol Hill newspaper, Roll Call, notes that a quarter of the members who left the 103rd Congress already have registered as lobbyists.

Both the executive and legislative branches recently have sought to tighten regulations on special interest groups. Legislation has been introduced in the House, for example, to ban members from representing foreign governments or political parties for 10 years after leaving elected office. There are also new regulations governing the size of gifts that may be accepted by members of the House and Senate. Members of Congress also must disclose any funds received from groups such as trade associations, like the International Automobile Manufacturers Association, that may represent a segment of an industry.

Laws which established guidelines for lobbyists are the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires the disclosure of foreign commercial and corporate activities, and the 1946 Lobby Disclosure Act, which requires lobbyists to register with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate. Congress in 1995 passed a new lobby disclosure act designed to close loopholes in the 1946 act.

In the past, references to lobbyists evoked visions of men and women in expensive attire entertaining powerful politicians. The scope has broadened enormously. Now the process is seemingly more about expertise and less about contacts. But contacts have to be broader, too, since junior members of Congress can sometimes affect the foreign policy debate in ways that only committee and subcommittee chairmen once could.

The “tensions” between the executive and legislative branches “will never disappear,” Massey predicts. Given that assumption alone, lobbyists will always have a role as facilitators for their clients in the realm of foreign policy-making. ©

LAWMAKERS ASSESS CONSTITUENTS' FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS

How Americans perceive the impact of foreign policy on their lives is influenced by various factors including developments in their home states, according to a bipartisan group of senators and representatives from across the nation. In a recent survey conducted by Contributing Editor Dian McDonald, the legislators were asked to assess the importance of foreign policy issues to their constituents and to cite which foreign policy issues are important to them and why. Here is how they responded:

SENATOR PAUL SIMON

(Democrat — Illinois)

I come from a state where one out of every 11 residents was born in a foreign country, where the great wave of European immigrants in the first half of this century was followed in the past decade by waves of Hispanics and Asians. Among those who left behind relatives and friends to move to America, there is much interest in foreign affairs.

President Clinton recognized that point when we traveled to Chicago recently while his wife was touring Europe. Hillary's itinerary took her to Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia and other countries. The President and first lady had talked on the telephone that day about each other's trips. "She called me and told me all the places she was going to see and she reeled them all off. I said, 'Look, I can make one trip to Chicago and see people from all those places,'" Clinton told a cheering Chicago crowd.

But cheering crowds are not what I usually encounter when U.S. foreign aid programs come up at town meetings throughout Illinois. In at least half the town meetings, someone asks why we don't cut foreign aid. Before I respond, I usually ask the audience what percentage of our budget they believe goes for foreign assistance. The guesses range from 10 to 25 percent. People are startled when I tell them it is less than one percent.

They have no idea that through our aid programs more than three million lives are saved each year through immunization programs; that as we help other countries survive economically, they frequently become our customers and lift our standard of living; that much of what we call foreign aid is spent for food and equipment in this country.

This public attitude can be reversed. Polls that ask if foreign aid should be cut show overwhelming support for such reductions, but the same people respond positively when asked if we should spend more to help hungry people living in other nations. We also should do more to encourage American students to study and travel abroad to improve our understanding of other cultures.

SENATOR FRANK MURKOWSKI

(Republican — Alaska)

Alaskans, who live at the top of the world, understand better than many Americans just how vital U.S. foreign policy is, not just to their economic well being, but to their liberty and freedom, as well.

Alaskans learned 54 years ago, when the Aleutian Islands were invaded, that foreign policy matters. That lesson, often reinforced during the Cold War, is still fresh in Alaskans' minds. Just recently during debate on the Department of Defense

Authorization bill Alaskans were reminded that, in the United States, only Alaska and Hawaii face the threat of missile attack from, for example, North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 missiles, should diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula fail.

Alaskans also know well that their economic well-being in the 21st Century is directly tied to expanding trade and commerce with the Pacific Rim. In 1995, my state exported \$1.45 billion (\$1,450 million) of its total seafood harvest overseas — far more than 75 percent. It sold \$585.3 million of its timber overseas — above 90 percent of the state's total timber harvest going to overseas buyers. It also sold \$172.9 million of its total mineral production — one-third — overseas.

Alaskans, since our financial future is so directly tied to events overseas, know that what happens in Indonesia or Taiwan, Chile or Japan, Russia or China can have an immediate effect on Alaskan exports and thus the incomes of thousands of Alaskan workers and their families. Alaskans know well that Anchorage is closer to Tokyo than it is to New York. While all of America's prosperity is truly dependent on the global economy, the ties are more apparent to Alaskans. Thus members of Congress from Alaska traditionally have a deep interest in foreign affairs.

REPRESENTATIVE BILL RICHARDSON
(Democrat — New Mexico)

New Mexicans recognize that the end of the Cold War does not mean that the U.S. should withdraw from its vital interests overseas. My constituency sees human rights, international development, and trade as important foreign policy issues facing the United States. New Mexicans have a unique interest in foreign affairs for a multitude of reasons. Our position as a border state puts us in tune with developments south of the border. Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories pioneer research which has global applications. Our three Air Force bases house men and women who often travel abroad to protect our national interest.

A large number of my constituents are deeply concerned, as I am, about human rights. This translates into a solid membership base for groups such as Amnesty International, which has over 2,000 members in my state. Work by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is crucial to congressional and public knowledge of human rights abuses. New Mexicans who volunteer for these groups should be commended for time well spent on behalf of humanity.

My state's large Spanish-speaking population has a special relationship with other Spanish-speaking countries of the world. My constituents are often concerned about developments in these countries and want the United States to play a role in granting aid and participating in humanitarian missions whenever possible. For example, Results, an international organization which promotes development in third world countries, has one of its most involved groups in New Mexico. New Mexican members were able to successfully lobby Congress to support a children's survival program which allocated \$484 million for basic immunization and food costs. Results' support of micro-credit programs which give small sums of money to individuals instead of government bureaucracy is effective and popular with my constituents.

Free and fair trade is important to my constituency because export-driven companies provide jobs in my district. Last year, New Mexico exported half-a-billion dollars worth of goods to the rest of the world. I led the fight to pass the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because I feel that in the long run, free trade means better and higher paying jobs for New Mexico and the country. The United States' ability to export more to emerging markets than Japan and Europe combined is a testament to the success of our long-standing free trade policy.

SENATOR OLYMPIA J. SNOWE
(Republican — Maine)

American foreign policy directly affects the lives, livelihood, and security of the people of Maine,

just as it affects the interests of all Americans. Maine seafood is prized in Japan for its quality and freshness, and retailers like L.L. Bean are finding new and important niches with storefronts in downtown Tokyo. A subsidiary of Central Maine Power, a major electric power utility, is today working to help modernize the infrastructure in nations once part of the Soviet bloc. For the 8,000 workers at Bath Iron Works in Maine, foreign and defense policy is the basis of a proud shipbuilding tradition, just as it is part of the fabric of life for workers at Kittery-Portsmouth Naval Shipyard or Brunswick Naval Air Station.

When I ran for the U.S. Senate I promised the people of Maine that while I would always work to assure Maine's place in America, I would also work to assure America's place in the world. American interests are shared by people throughout the world, whether in protecting security and stability, insisting on equal treatment in trade relations, supporting the rule of law or encouraging the growth of political freedom, democracy and human rights.

In my years of foreign policy work — as a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and previously, as a member of the then-Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives — I have been active in each of these areas. From assuring the security of our new embassy in Moscow during the Cold War, to participating in the first official U.S. delegation to Cambodia immediately after the overthrow of the genocidal Khmer Rouge, I have tried to assume an appropriate congressional role of oversight and encouragement. My congressional responsibilities took me to Bosnia and Croatia last fall as part of a special Senate delegation that landed amidst shelling in Sarajevo; previously, I served as an official observer in landmark elections in Central America; and investigated the activities of the notorious Abu Nidal terrorist group in Eastern Europe before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. And over the past several years, I have worked consistently to strengthen the principle of a nation's right to self-defense in America's policy toward Bosnia.

America's importance abroad is unquestioned, not only to the people of the world who share our values and interests, but also to all Americans.

REPRESENTATIVE ELIOT L. ENGEL

(Democrat — New York)

Most of my work in Congress is directed toward improving the socio-economic realities confronting people in the 17th Congressional District and throughout the New York City metro area. I have fought long and hard to improve health care, promote job training, expand educational opportunities, and ensure that senior citizens can feel secure when they reach their 60's, 70's, and 80's.

Nevertheless, I have served for many years on the International Relations Committee and have responsibilities to do what I can to promote U.S. interests beyond our borders. I am co-Chair of the Congressional Albanian Issues Caucus and the Congressional Peace Accord Monitoring Group which monitors the Middle East Peace process. And I am a member of the Ad Hoc Caucus on Irish Affairs, the African Trade and Development Caucus, and the Caucus on India.

I firmly believe that American leadership is critical to the maintenance of order within the international system and represents the preeminent factor in support of human rights and democracy. Given our leadership role, I feel that the U.S. should not cut its foreign assistance to developing nations or our closest friends and allies. With proper planning and oversight, small amounts of assistance can go a very long way and help a large number of people. Indeed, in many ways, foreign aid is our first line of defense against hostile powers around the world. For a program representing only one percent of our total budget, the benefits of foreign aid far outweigh its drawbacks.

The Bronx and Westchester, within my congressional district, are among the most ethnically diverse areas of the United States. Having large African-American, Hispanic, Jewish,

Irish, Italian, Albanian, and other communities within the 17th district, the interests of my constituents range well beyond the borders of the United States. As such, I have been proud to represent their concerns to the U.S. State Department and other agencies which deal with foreign affairs and in the future will work with them to see that U.S. foreign policy-makers take their opinions firmly into account.

SENATOR DON NICKLES

(Republican — Oklahoma)

Landlocked Oklahoma is located in the center of the United States, but Oklahomans have a strong sense of the importance of what happens in the rest of the world having fought in four foreign wars to defend or reestablish freedom in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

A major international concern of Oklahomans today, and the foreign policy issue I believe is of paramount importance, is the surprising fact that this country has no defense against ballistic missile attack. Despite the fact that the Russians have already put into place a system for defending Moscow, and despite the fact that we are working with the Israelis to create a system to defend their country from missile attack, we have no such defense ourselves.

That is why I am an original cosponsor of the Defend America Act, a bill which declares it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system by the end of 2003. The Defend America Act says this entire country should be defended against limited, unauthorized or accidental ballistic missile attack in recognition of both existing threats and those which almost certainly will develop in the future.

Political instability and uncertainty in Russia and China highlight the need to guard against a possible unauthorized or accidental missile launch. Recent saber rattling by the Chinese during the Taiwan Straits crisis should have provided a wake-up call for us all. The other threat comes

from at least two dozen other countries that currently possess or are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons — and the means to deliver them. Many countries that already have short range missiles are now seeking to acquire more sophisticated, long range missiles.

REPRESENTATIVE E (KIKI) DE LA GARZA

(Democrat — Texas)

The area of Texas I represent (South Texas) is quite diverse both ethnically and culturally. We are the southernmost tip of the United States bordering Mexico. What that means is that on a daily basis we see the world in more of an international way. We always have.

Everyone today talks about how new technology is making the world smaller, how we are becoming more of a global community and how we are more interactive than ever before in the past. For us this is not a new concept. We have always been interactive with our neighbors to the south and they with us. We have long since learned to see the world in a broad scope.

Every day those of us who live in South Texas deal with foreign policy issues. There are the obvious issues such as NAFTA, immigration, trade, etc. Then there is the larger world picture involving issues such as foreign aid, U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts, terrorism, or currently Most Favored Nation status for China. All of these and more are concerns about which I hear.

My constituents are very informed, just as I am certain most Americans are today. I hear, as I'm certain most other members do, about whatever issues are most topical. In today's information age, what most individuals view as pressing is what is brought into their homes by the media on the evening news or in their morning papers. Because foreign policy issues, in general, are not perceived as having any direct effect, I think it's fairly accurate to say that most people do not consider them to be all that important.

The recent tragedy in Saudi Arabia, however, would be an exception. It is an example of the type incident that draws us as a people together. We as a nation are always concerned about the safety of our forces abroad and when something affects them, it affects us. That is because it is no longer an abstract — it's the father, the son, the cousin, the friend, or the neighbor we know. The Persian Gulf War, the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia — these are other examples where people are quite concerned about foreign policy. In general, though, people do not give quite the same attention to most other foreign policy matters.

SENATOR JOE LIEBERMAN
(Democrat — Connecticut)

Our government's first mission, as stated in the U.S. Constitution, is to "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Foreign policy is central to protecting national security and economic growth. If we fail to address foreign policy concerns, all that we do domestically will be for naught.

The American people benefit from the prevention of war and the cultivation of good relations with the nations of the world. Economic growth is spurred on by expanding trade. The Connecticut economy, for example, benefits enormously from trade with other nations. Our state's exports grew by nearly 100 percent between 1987 and 1992. The export market can remain a major engine for economic expansion and job creation in Connecticut and throughout the United States in the 21st century.

And the effective pursuit of foreign policy goals can lead to the expansion of democratic, peace-

loving states and a reduction in cycles of totalitarian conflict. We won the Cold War thanks to a combination of a strong defense and a realistic, dynamic foreign policy. In this uncertain time of transition, we must maintain such strength and vision if we are to build a new generation of peace among nations.

Three foreign policy concerns loom especially large in 1996. The first is terrorism, brought home so tragically by the recent bombing in Saudi Arabia. We must work harder to protect American troops, especially when they are defending our interests in parts of the world where they are most vulnerable to attack. And we must work closely with our allies to fight back against terrorists — especially through the aggressive use of intelligence resources and infiltration of terrorist groups.

A second foreign policy issue of great concern is Bosnia. I believe the capture of those who have been indicted for crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia should be made a priority for those nations involved in restoring peace in this region.

A third issue is NATO. I support the enlargement of NATO, encouraging new states to join the security alliance if they can contribute significantly and have democratized sufficiently. Expanding NATO and restoring peace in Bosnia each, in their own way, reinforce the prospect of continued peace in Europe.

By focusing on improved relations and increased trade among all nations, especially those committed to democracy, we will enhance chances for peace and prosperity throughout the world. ●

FROM BILL TO LAW: A LONG AND COMPLEX PROCESS

Turning a proposed bill into law is often a lengthy process that involves hundreds of persons — congressional staff members as well as legislators themselves in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

A bill must be approved by both bodies in identical form. Once that happens, it is sent to the President for his signature. The President may sign the bill, making it law; allow it to pass without signing it, indicating his disapproval; or he may veto it and return it to Congress. Congress can overturn his veto by a two-thirds vote in each chamber. If Congress has fewer than ten days left until adjournment, the President can kill a bill by refusing to sign it. This is called a pocket veto.

Only a member of the House or Senate can introduce bills, although members themselves do not originate most of them. The vast majority of legislative initiatives today are proposed by the executive branch — the White House and federal agencies — and by special-interest organizations such as trade unions and business associations. Thousands of bills are introduced in each two-year session of Congress, but most never make it through the full process. For example, in 1993 and 1994, during the 103rd Congress, 8,544 bills and joint resolutions were introduced, but only 473 of them became law.

In the House, a representative simply tosses the proposed bill into the “hopper” — a small box on the House clerk’s desk. In the Senate, senators usually make a brief speech explaining the bill’s purpose and drop the bill at the desk for processing. Clerks number the bills in the order they are received and send them to the Government Printing Office to be printed. They are then filed in the House and Senate document rooms, printed in the next day’s Congressional Record, and made available in electronic data

banks for public access. For example, H.R. 2 (House of Representatives 2) would be the second bill offered in the House during a particular session. And S. 5 (Senate 5) would be the fifth bill offered in the Senate.

All bills for raising revenue must originate in the House, while consent for the ratification of treaties and confirmation of presidential nominees are solely Senate responsibilities. Either body can originate any other type of legislation.

A bill is assigned to the appropriate committee or committees in each body by its respective presiding officer. The chair of the committee or its relevant subcommittee schedules hearings on bills he or she wants to pursue. Expert witnesses, representatives of government agencies, and spokespersons of various interested organizations give their views on the proposed legislation. The hearings generally are open to the public, unless they deal with classified information, and often receive extensive newspaper and television coverage. Following the hearings, the full committee meets to “mark up” the bill, which means finalize it for floor action. The committee can approve and report the bill in its original form, report the bill with proposed changes, or table (fail to report) the bill.

Once the bill is reported it is put on the legislative calendar of the body that is considering it. In the House, bills go to the Rules Committee for a “rule” on time limits and other conditions of debate before being sent to the floor. The House must first approve the rule before the bill itself is debated. In the Senate, the majority leader decides when a bill will be brought to the floor. Senators also may make a motion from the floor to call up a bill.

There is no time limit on debate in the Senate, as there is in the House — a situation that sometimes leads to an extended “filibuster” designed to block

a vote on the measure under consideration. A filibuster can be ended only by invoking “cloture” — a vote to end debate requiring the affirmative vote of 60 (of the 100) senators.

Both the House and Senate may consider bills simultaneously, but final bills must be identical in both bodies. If the House and the Senate pass different versions of the same overall legislation, which is generally the case, then a special conference committee composed of representatives of both chambers meets to try to settle the differences. If they reach agreement, the compromise is sent back to the floors of the House

and Senate for a final vote. If both bodies approve it, the compromise is sent to the President.

A majority vote is sufficient to pass most bills in the House and Senate. Some legislation — for example constitutional amendments and the overriding of presidential vetoes — requires a two-thirds vote in both houses.

If passed, a bill is printed on parchment, signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, and sent to the White House for consideration by the President. ●

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

Much of the work of the House of Representatives and the Senate — whether it pertains to foreign or domestic affairs — is done at the committee level. How committees function, therefore, has a direct bearing on how the two chambers of Congress approach foreign policy.

Typically, both representatives and senators belong to at least two committees. The majority and minority party leadership in both bodies assigns members to committees according to their interests and the interests of the part of the country they represent. An attempt is made to get geographic and political diversity on the committees as well as subject expertise. For example, most members of the judiciary committees are lawyers. Power within the committees is weighted in favor of whichever

political party controls the chamber since the majority party selects the committee chairs and has the most members on each committee.

In the House, committee chairs are elected at a party caucus at the beginning of each two-year congressional session. They usually are the most senior majority party members on the committees, but not always. In the Senate, the full Senate elects committee chairs according to seniority. A committee chair appoints professional staff to assist the committee, sets the committee schedule, determines what bills will be discussed, what expert witnesses will be called to testify, when public hearings will take place and when — and if — prospective legislation will be voted on by the committee. Subcommittee chairs are generally chosen by the full committees. The most senior

committee member of the minority party is referred to as the ranking minority member.

Traditionally, the committees with primary responsibility for foreign affairs are the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. The two panels oversee the nation's foreign policy and authorize the international affairs budget, which provides funding for the State Department and foreign assistance programs.

The most important difference between the two committees is that the Senate panel makes recommendations to the full Senate on ratification of treaties and consent to the appointment of diplomatic officials including the Secretary of State and U.S. ambassadors. The Constitution grants sole authority for these responsibilities to the Senate.

The House International Relations Committee currently has five subcommittees. Three are regional — Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Western Hemisphere — and two are functional — International Economic Policy and Trade, and International Operations and Human Rights. In previous sessions, there also was a subcommittee for Europe and the Middle East, but that responsibility now belongs to the full committee.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has seven subcommittees. Five are geographic — African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European Affairs, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs — while two are functional — International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion; and International Operations.

In recent years the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate have become more influential in foreign policy because of the frequent failure of Congress to pass authorizing legislation for foreign aid. Since 1980 the International Relations and Foreign Relations Committees have only once — in 1985 — been able to get an overall foreign aid authorization bill through

Congress and signed into law. The reason, say congressional sources, is because it is hard to get a consensus on legislation dealing with a broad range of foreign aid programs. What has happened, instead, is that on a case by case basis, where consensus exists, separate authorizing bills are passed.

As a rule, authorizing committees create programs and set overall policy guidelines and spending limits. Appropriations committees then appropriate money in line with the parameters that the authorizing committees have set. But when there is no authorizing legislation, the appropriations committees take on a larger role in spending decisions.

Other congressional committees also share jurisdiction over foreign policy legislation:

— The Select Intelligence Committees of both chambers monitor the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies.

— The House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee deal with defense matters including military operations of the Defense Department.

— The Judiciary Committees of both bodies deal with immigration policies and all areas of civil and criminal law.

— The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee deal with trade bills.

— The House and Senate Banking Committees review international economic policy, including export and foreign trade promotion, and consider the budget requests for multilateral lending institutions.

— House and Senate Commerce Committees deal with interstate and foreign commerce and regulation of interstate and foreign communications.

Following are the leaders of the committees that deal with the majority of foreign affairs issues in the 104th Congress. Committee chairs are always from the majority party — the Republican Party in the current Congress.

House International Relations Committee

Chair — Benjamin Gilman, New York
Ranking Minority Member — Lee Hamilton, Indiana

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Chair — Jesse Helms, North Carolina
Ranking Minority Member — Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island

House Appropriations Committee

Chair — Robert Livingston, Louisiana
Ranking Minority Member — David Obey, Wisconsin

Senate Appropriations Committee

Chair — Mark Hatfield, Oregon
Ranking Minority Member — Robert Byrd, West Virginia

House National Security Committee

Chair — Floyd Spence, South Carolina
Ranking Minority Member — Ronald Dellums, California

Senate Armed Services Committee

Chair — Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Ranking Minority Member — Sam Nunn, Georgia

House Select Committee on Intelligence

Chair — Larry Combest, Texas
Ranking Minority Member — Norm Dicks, Washington

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Chair — Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania
Ranking Minority Member — Bob Kerrey, Nebraska

House Judiciary Committee

Chair — Henry Hyde, Illinois
Ranking Minority Member — John Conyers, Michigan

Senate Judiciary Committee

Chair — Orrin Hatch, Utah
Ranking Minority Member — Joseph Biden, Delaware

House Ways and Means Committee

Chair — Bill Archer, Texas
Ranking Minority Member — Sam Gibbons, Florida

Senate Finance Committee

Chair — William Roth, Delaware
Ranking Minority Member — Daniel Patrick Moynihan, New York

House Banking and Financial Services Committee

Chair — Jim Leach, Iowa
Ranking Minority Member — Henry Gonzalez, Texas

Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee

Chair — Alfonse D'Amato, New York
Ranking Minority Member — Paul Sarbanes, Maryland

Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee

Chair — Larry Pressler, South Dakota
Ranking Minority Member — Ernest Hollings, South Carolina

House Commerce Committee

Chair — Thomas Bliley, Virginia
Ranking Minority Member — John Dingell, Michigan

ACTION ON CAPITOL HILL

(As of July 16)

FY 1997 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 3230, S. 1745

DESCRIPTION: Would authorize fiscal year 1997 spending for defense programs — \$265,600 million in the Senate version, \$266,700 million in the House. The bill also addresses once again some of the most contentious issues in the 1996 authorization bill: the level of assistance to former Soviet states, the method of accounting for personnel missing in action, rules governing homosexuals in the military and personnel who are HIV-positive, and availability of abortions in military hospitals.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved its version May 15 by a vote of 272-153.

SENATE ACTION: Approved its version July 10 by a vote of 68-31.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: A House-Senate conference committee is expected to address the issues in disagreement later in July. The final outcome remains in doubt as White House officials have threatened a possible veto of the measure in either the House or Senate version — partly because both exceed the President's budget request by more than \$12,000 million dollars, earmarked mainly for development and production of new weapons.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 3144, S. 1635

DESCRIPTION: Would mandate deployment by 2003 of an anti-ballistic missile defense system that could defend all 50 states.

HOUSE ACTION: National Security Committee approved H.R. 3144 on May 1, and International Relations Committee discharged the measure on May 16. It has been placed on the House legislative calendar for floor action, but no specific time has yet been scheduled for that debate.

SENATE ACTION: Armed Services Committee reported the measure May 16, but without issuing a written report. The Senate took up the measure June 4 but failed to get the necessary two-thirds margin to end debate and bring it to a final vote.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Administration opposes the legislation, arguing that deployment of such a system is not justified by any near-term threat.

IRAN OIL SANCTIONS

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 3107, S. 1228

DESCRIPTION: Both bills would impose sanctions on persons exporting certain goods or technology that would enhance Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved its version of the legislation June 19 by a unanimous 415-0 vote.

SENATE ACTION: Approved its version December 20, 1995 by voice vote.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Differences between the two measures remain to be worked out between the House and Senate. The administration has supported legislation to tighten sanctions against Iran and has continued to work with Congress in developing details.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 2202, S. 1664

DESCRIPTION: Would increase border patrols aimed at reducing illegal entry into the United States, strengthen measures to block illegal immigrants from finding jobs and cut off most public benefits to unlawful immigrants.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved its version March 21 by a vote of 333-87.

SENATE ACTION: Approved its version May 2 by a vote of 97-3.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: The two versions still must be reconciled by a conference committee of House and Senate members, with a number of controversial provisions in both bills remaining to be worked out. Administration sources have indicated that one provision most likely to draw a veto, should it remain in the final legislation, is a House proposal allowing states to deny public schooling to illegal immigrants. ●

SPOTLIGHT ON U.S. SPEAKERS — LAWRENCE L. KORB

Lawrence L. Korb, Director of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, says that in the post-Cold War era, Congress and the White House often differ on military issues, and when they do, military policy "is settled by compromise."

Korb served from 1981 to 1985 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics, a position in which he administered about 70 percent of the defense budget.

He made two recent trips to France for USIA where he lectured on U.S. defense issues.

In the following summary, Korb describes the increasingly assertive role of Congress in shaping national defense policy:

During the Cold War, the Congress essentially deferred to the executive on military matters, even when many in Congress disagreed with the direction the executive was taking, for example, in the Vietnam war in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, since the end of the Cold War, the Congress has taken an increasingly assertive role in military matters. This has been especially true when the executive and legislative branches have been controlled by different parties, as has been the case in all but two of the seven years since the Berlin Wall came down in the fall of 1989.

In the spring of 1990, the Democratic-controlled Congress forced the Republican leadership in the White House and the Pentagon to accept much larger cuts in defense spending than the executive branch wished. President Bush's secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, argued that despite the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Soviet communist expansionism still remained a threat to the U.S., and the United States should not cut its defenses precipitously. Many Democrats in Congress, on the other hand, felt that the defense budget could be reduced from its current level by as much as 50 percent by the end of the decade.

Eventually the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees worked out a compromise plan to cut the defense budget by 25 percent. Similarly, in the fall of 1990, the Armed Services Committees, controlled by Democrats, held widely publicized and critical hearings on the wisdom of the Bush administration's policy in the

Persian Gulf. These hearings forced the administration to seek a vote authorizing the U.S. military to use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, something that was not done when the U.S. entered the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.

Since capturing Congress in 1994, the Republicans, with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have added some 20 percent to the defense procurement requests of the Democratic Clinton administration. Although President Clinton agreed to spend the additional funds for military weapons, he vetoed Republican attempts to force him to deploy a national missile defense by 2003 and to prevent American forces from serving under foreign command. Moreover, it was the congressional resolution in the spring of 1995 demanding that the administration unilaterally lift the arms embargo in Bosnia that galvanized the Clinton administration into taking an active leadership role in bringing an end to hostilities in Bosnia. But, it was also a congressional reluctance to send American ground troops to Bosnia that caused President Clinton to say he would limit the American deployment to a year. To ensure that Congress will have a role if the executive should decide not to bring all the troops home after a year, Congress has only appropriated sufficient funds for a year-long operation.

Since the end of the Cold War, military issues often are viewed differently by Congress and the White House. When this occurs, military policy, like policy in most other areas, is settled by compromise. ©

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Eksterowicz, Anthony and Hastedt, Glenn. "Congress, the Presidency and World Order: The Interplay of International and Domestic Politics." *THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES*, Fall 1994, pp: 359-379.
- Fisher, Louis. "Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives." *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY*, Winter 1994-95, pp: 739-762.
http://www.eneews.com/magazines/polisci_quarterly/archive/120194.toc.html
- Fisher, Louis. *THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992, 257 pp.
[gopher://gopher.cqalert.com:70/OF-1%3A40496%3A15CQPRESSCATALOG%20gopher](http://gopher.cqalert.com:70/OF-1%3A40496%3A15CQPRESSCATALOG%20gopher)
- Greenberger, Robert S. "Dateline Capitol Hill: The New Majority's Foreign Policy." *FOREIGN POLICY*, Winter 1995, pp: 159-169.
- Hinckley, Barbara. *LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE: FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, 252 pp.
- Kagan, Robert. "A Retreat from Power?" *COMMENTARY*, July 1995, pp: 19-25.
- Kitfield, James. "Who Speaks for America?" *GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE*, April 1995, pp: 14-20.
- Korb, Lawrence J. "Who's in Charge Here? National Security and the Contract with America." *THE BROOKINGS REVIEW*, Fall 1995, pp: 4-7.
<http://www.Brook.edu/pub/review/fall95.htm>
- Lindsay, James M. *CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, 228 pp.
- Mann, Thomas, editor. *A QUESTION OF BALANCE: THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY*. Washington: Brookings, 1990, 265 pp.
- Muravchik, Joshua. "Affording Foreign Policy: The Problem Is Not Wallet, But Will." *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, March 1996, pp: 8-13.
- Newnham, Jeff. "New Constraints for U.S. Foreign Policy." *THE WORLD TODAY*, April 1995, pp. 72-74.
- Oleszek, Walter J. *CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS*, 4th ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995, 373 pp.
http://voter96.cqalert.com/plweb-cgi/cq_mallprod.pl?960620-25+7031
- Patterson, James. "Not So Fast, Newt: The Presidency Is Stronger Than You Think." *THE NEW REPUBLIC*, January 23, 1995, pp: 26-30.
<http://www.eneews.com/magazines/tnr/archive/1995/01/012395.4.html>
- Peterson, Paul E., editor. *THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994, 312 pp.
- Ripley, Randall B., Lindsay, James M., and Farrell, Theo. *CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 337 pp.
- Saunders, Richard. "Democratic President, Republican Foreign Policy?" *ORBIS*, Spring 1995, pp: 149-153.
- Scigliano, Robert. "Politics, the Constitution, and the President's War Power." *THE NEW POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY* (David Deese, editor). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 285 pp.
- Stark, Steven. "Too Representative Government." *THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY*, May 1995, pp: 92-102.
- Sundquist, James L., editor. *BACK TO GRIDLOCK: GOVERNANCE IN THE CLINTON YEARS*. Washington: Brookings, 1996, 115 pp.
<http://www.Brook.edu/pub/books/gridlck2.htm>
- Taylor, Andrew J. and Rourke, John T. "Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process." *THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS*, May 1995, pp: 460-468.
- Thurber, James A. *RIVALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996, 220 pp.
[gopher://gopher.cqalert.com:70/OF-1%3A40496%3A10CQBOOKSCATALOG%20gopher](http://gopher.cqalert.com:70/OF-1%3A40496%3A10CQBOOKSCATALOG%20gopher)

Uslaner, Eric M. "All Politics Are Global: Interest Groups in Foreign Policy Making." INTEREST GROUP POLITICS (Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, editors), 4th ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995, 435 pp.
gopher://gopher.cqalert.com:70/OF-1%3A40496%3A10CQBOOKSCATALOG%20gopher

Waldman, Steven. THE BILL: HOW LEGISLATION BECOMES LAW: A CASE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE BILL. New York: Viking Books, 1995, 301 pp.

Weissman, Stephen R. A CULTURE OF DEFERENCE: CONGRESS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. New York: Basic Books, 1995, 254 pp.

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: KEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that USIS assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below which reside solely with the providers.

Almanac of American Politics
<http://politicsusa.com/PoliticsUSA/resources/almanac/>

Centers for Research and Policy Development
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/~library/resorgs.htm>

Committee on Foreign Relations
<http://www.policy.net/capweb/Senate/SenateCom/FOR.html>

Congressional Quarterly Press Catalog
gopher://gopher.cqalert.com:70/OF-1%3A40496%3A15CQPRESSCATALOG%20gopher

Finding Legislative Information
<http://www.library.yale.edu/govdocs/legislat.html>

Government, Congress and Law
<http://lcweb.loc.gov/global/gov.html>

House International Relations Committee
http://www.house.gov/international_relations/welcome.htm

How Our Laws Are Made
<http://Thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.html>

International Affairs
<http://www.duke.edu/~gilliatt/internatl/index.html>

Political Science Resources
<http://www.keele.ac.uk/~depts/po/psr.htm>

PoliticsNow
<http://PoliticsUSA.com/>

THOMAS: Legislative Information on the Internet
<http://Thomas.loc.gov>

UniPress Software: W3's Will T. Bill
<http://www.unipress.com/will-t-bill.html>

U.S. House of Representatives
<http://www.house.gov/>

U.S. House of Representatives Internet Law Library
U.S. Code
<http://law.house.gov/usc.htm>

U.S. House of Representatives Who's Who and How To Contact Them
<http://www.house.gov/Whoswho.html>

U.S. Senate
<http://www.senate.gov/>

U.S. Senate Democratic Policy Committee
<ftp://www.senate.gov/committee/Dem-Policy/general/dpc.html>

U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee
<http://www.senate.gov/comm/repub-policy/general/aboutrpc.htm>

What's New on the CQ Gopher
gopher://gopher.cqalert.com/

ARTICLE ALERT: OTHER POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Abramowitz, Morton I. SENSE AND SENSIBILITY: MAKING OUR WAY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 62, no. 14, May 1, 1996, pp. 425-430)

Abramowitz observes five elements of U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy: maintaining strong alliances, fostering economic integration, controlling weapons proliferation, humanitarianism and promoting democratic values. He also discusses the increasing influence of domestic politics on the management of foreign affairs. Efforts to manage current foreign policy issues, such as Russia, China and Bosnia, are affected by U.S. politics as well as by the political dynamics in those countries themselves.

Abrams, Elliott. THE SHIPRIDER SOLUTION: POLICING THE CARIBBEAN (The National Interest, no. 43, Spring 1996, pp. 86-92)

Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, states that the Caribbean is "an increasingly troubled region, and reliance on a foreign power for security and prosperity may be the most sensible form of nationalism." And the only available foreign power, he asserts, is the United States. Abrams describes three key U.S. interests in the area: migration, drugs and the maintenance of democracy and human rights.

Asmus, Ronald D.; Blackwill, Robert D.; Larrabee, F. Stephen. CAN NATO SURVIVE? (Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 79-101)

This article proposes a framework to ensure the survival of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Proposed is a new transatlantic security bargain calling for the United States to participate fully in all conflicts in Europe in which there is a NATO consensus to act. In turn, this proposal calls for the allies to share with the United States, through NATO planning and execution, the military burdens and risks of meeting mutual security threats outside Europe.

Greeley, Brendan M.; Schultz, Fred L. ABOUT FIGHTING AND WINNING WARS: AN INTERVIEW WITH DICK CHENEY (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 122/5/1, 119, May 1996, pp. 32-40)
Former Defense Secretary Cheney fields questions on NATO, the U.S.-Japanese relationship, and military

downsizing. He says "a stronger public rationale" must be developed in the United States on the need to retain a significantly sized military force. There has been "almost no discussion" in the lead-up to the 1996 presidential election about America's security role in the world, U.S. strategic requirements, what the U.S. military should be doing, "or how big the defense budget ought to be," says Cheney, now president of Halliburton Company in Dallas.

Ikenberry, G. John. THE MYTH OF POST-COLD WAR CHAOS (Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3, May/June 1996, pp. 79-91)

Political scientist Ikenberry contends that the world order created in the 1940s still exists and is "in many ways stronger than ever." The challenge for U.S. foreign policy, he says, is "not to imagine and build a new world order but to reclaim and renew an old one — an innovative and durable order that has been hugely successful." According to Ikenberry, the end of the Cold War was less the end of a world order than the collapse of the communist world into an expanding Western order. The United States is "not adrift in uncharted seas," he says, but is rather at the center of a world of "its own making."

Lagon, Mark P. ARE "INFLUENTIALS" LESS INFLUENTIAL? U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ELITES IN A POST-COLD WAR INFORMATION AGE (World Affairs, vol. 158, no. 3, Winter 1996, pp. 122-135)

Lagon advocates that elites inside and outside of government play a diminished role in shaping U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. He asserts that the suggestion that the arrival of the information age and the end of the Cold War will shrink the role of foreign policy elites is not logical when analyzed against extrapolated data. Lagon discusses the current progression of elite opinion about foreign policy in an era characterized by the ascendant power of the Congress. ©

*The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service:
<http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>*